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Abstract— Situation awareness consists of “the perception of 
the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, 
the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their 
status in the near future”.  Being aware of the security situation is 
then mandatory to launch proper security reactions in response to 
cybersecurity attacks. Security Incident and Event Management 
solutions are deployed within Security Operation Centers. Some 
vendors propose machine learning based approaches to detect 
intrusions by analysing networks behaviours. But cyberattacks 
like Wannacry and NotPetya, which shut down hundreds of 
thousands of computers, demonstrated that networks monitoring 
and surveillance solutions remain insufficient. Detecting these 
complex attacks (a.k.a. Advanced Persistent Threats) requires 
security administrators to retain a large number of logs just in case 
problems are detected and involve the investigation of past 
security events. This approach generates massive data that have to 
be analysed at the right time in order to detect any accidental or 
caused incident. In the same time, security administrators are not 
yet seasoned to such a task and lack the desired skills in data 
science. As a consequence, a large amount of data is available and 
still remains unexplored which leaves number of indicators of 
compromise under the radar. Building on the concept of situation 
awareness, we developed a situation-driven framework, called 
dynSMAUG, for dynamic security management. This approach 
simplifies the security management of dynamic systems and allows 
the specification of security policies at a high-level of abstraction 
(close to security requirements). This invited paper aims at 
exposing real security situations elicitation, coming from networks 
security experts, and showing the results of exploratory analysis 
techniques using complex event processing techniques to identify 
and extract security situations from a large volume of logs. The 
results contributed to the extension of the dynSMAUG solution. 
Keywords— security situation; CEP; SIEM; SoC; IoC; APT; 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Security attacks that were launched by isolated hackers in 
search of glory have been replaced today by targeted attacks 
committed by well-organized criminal groups [1]. 
We moved from Script kiddies to Advanced Persistent 
Threats (APTs) for years now. If their commonalities are based 
on the exploitation of vulnerabilities present in the information 
system, their purpose as well as their means are very different. 
Script kiddies do not require any expertise and are undertaken 
by very little technical background, using  “off-the-shelf” 
toolkits and/or mostly copy-and-paste scripts. They are based on 
zero-day or older vulnerabilities by taking advantage of systems 
and software lacks of updates. The motivation for the attackers 
was more the curiosity than the challenge to hack the system; the 
consequence, a web site defacement or an easy and fast servers 
compromise in order to scan other Internet servers or to launch 
spam campaigns. A main characteristic could be the fact that the 
attackers do not even try to hide their exploits and go unseen. 
These attacks remain gross and do not generally last in time. 
Once the goals reached, the attackers pass to the next targets. 
APT are more complex. They are based on a sophisticated 
combination of commercial tools, malwares and rootkits, as well 
as back doors in order to escalade privileges on the client 
network and move to other servers. Such an implementation 
requires qualified technical skills and a far more advanced and 
professional organization. Based on vulnerabilities that exploits 
could take advantage of, as for Script kiddies, but also 
obfuscating the performed actions, and by covering up the traces 
thanks to anti-forensic techniques, the latter type of attacks has 
a more severe and destructive impact on the assets as well as on 
the brand image of the enterprise. The attacks being stealth are 
generally not detected and maintained for a while in the system. 
Often by the profit motivated, the pursued goal may be data 
theft, industrial espionage or sabotage resulting in the 
destruction of information.  
  Consequently, security has to evolve on an ongoing basis and 
the security management process should be flexible enough to 
quickly adapt the organization security to address these new 
threats. More precisely, security detection that consisted in 
manually analysing log files has given way to dedicated 
detection mechanisms. Security administrators had installed 
network and host based intrusion detection systems (IDS) that 
had the ability to perform real-time traffic analysis (e.g., 
SNORT, Surricata, Bro or OSSEC). However, new attacks 
being more sophisticated, these IDSs could not detect advanced 
attacks alone. Such complex attacks require correlating all the 
security events generated by each IDS in order to be detected. 
As a consequence, security information and event management 
systems (SIEM) were introduced on top of IDSs to 
aggregate/correlate security events and to propose dashboards. 
Dedicated SIEMS such as OSSIM, PRELUDE, QRadar, RSA 
or Splunk etc. have been deployed. However, with the growing 
number of security events to consider, the current strategy is to 
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implement a SIEM by using big data solutions such as the ELK 
stack (ElasticSearch/ Logstash, Kibana). Indeed, this strategy 
fits with operational scalability issues by facilitating cloud 
deployments and by providing rich features for data analytics. 
We will discuss the needs for SIEMs in security operation 
centres in section II. 
Signature-based detection allows to characterize and isolate 
many intrusions, but it leaves under the radars many of the 
advanced persistent threats inventoried so far such as APT32 or 
Wannacry… There are initiatives being conducted using 
behavioural analysis techniques to prevent from illegitimate 
traffics and persistent compromises of the IT services if not the 
whole information system. We will discuss them in Section III. 
Even if an organization is following the best practices 
approaches, attackers can always exploit zero-day 
vulnerabilities, or make a social engineering attack to introduce 
themselves into the network of the organization. Then, in their 
next step, attackers attempt to persist in the targeted 
environment, and use different mechanisms to hide their 
activities and achieve their goals. Attackers use legitimate tools 
as well for achieving malicious goals, which is hard to detect 
using the actual available solutions. It is where Threat 
Intelligence collaborative solutions and platforms are supposed 
to help in getting valid indicators of compromise (IOCs); 
however, in the context of APTs, these indicators change 
quickly. In addition, inspecting the network traffic is useless, 
since it is encrypted. How to distinguish a successful password 
based authentication from a legitimate user initiating a remote 
session from an illegitimate resulting access, successful 
authentication but with a stolen password? That means how to 
detect that a user account is being hacked and how to react to 
such a situation. We will present such a scenario in section IV.  
In Section V, we propose a situation-driven framework, 
called DynSMAUG, for dynamic security management, built on 
the concept of situation awareness. This approach simplifies the 
security management of dynamic systems and allows the 
specification of security policies at a high-level of abstraction 
(close to security requirements) as considered in section VI.  
The effectiveness of the approach and the deployment of the 
defined protection measures are dealt with in section VI before 
concluding in section VII. 
II. SECURITY INFORMATION AND EVENT MANAGEMENT 
A complete protection against security incidents is almost 
impossible. On the contrary, incident detection may launch a fast 
response at least in order to contain the intrusions on the 
information system. The infrastructure devices generating large 
volumes of events, it is mandatory to process them 
automatically. 
A SIEM is a tool dedicated to this task. It allows the 
monitoring of the information system events in real-time. The 
objective of SIEM systems is to monitor the whole IT 
infrastructure (network devices, PCs, data stores, application 
servers, smartphones etc.) in order to investigate and look for 
evidence when required [2]. A SIEM should provide the 
functionalities to: 
- Aggregate security events from many sources. Standard 
formats for the exchange of security events have been 
proposed at the IETF level such as Intrusion Detection 
Message Exchange Format (IDMEF - RFC 4765) or 
Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF - 
RFC 5070) 
- Correlate a large mass of events to make real-time searches 
- Safeguarding long-term security information especially for 
doing digital forensics 
- Alert the network administrator automatically when a 
potential attack is detected 
- Provide useful security information in dashboards to 
facilitate the automatically generated alerts display and 
assisting security administrators in manual/automated 
search when a potential attack has been detected  
SIEMs are usually used for monitoring: 
- authentication activities (abnormal authentication, non-
working hours) 
- shared accounts (session requests for the same user account)  
- sessions activities 
- connections details (closed ports, internal blocked) 
- abnormal administrator’s behaviour  (on inactive admin 
accounts, unusual activities) 
- information theft (data exfiltration, data leaks)  
- vulnerabilities scans and correlation (suspicious events)  
- statistical analysis (inbound/outband throughput, data per 
application)  
- intrusion detection et infection (IDS data, IPS, antivirus, 
application anti-malware) 
- system modifications (by the means of configuration change 
data) 
To work efficiently, a SIEM needs to integrate different 
sources of logs and events (servers logs, routers logs, systems 
logs, applications/services logs etc.) by the means of so-called 
connectors. These connectors, in general, provide a standardised 
representation of the logged events and their recorded attributes 
(timestamps, addresses, etc.). 
Rules detection describes the suspicious behaviour and the 
method of an attack against all monitored devices and 
increasingly end-systems or endpoints. The monitoring agents 
raise alerts based on IOCs – Indicators of Compromise. IOCs 
may be used to refer to specific artifacts left by an intrusion, or 
greater sets of information that allow for the detection of 
intrusions or other activities conducted by attackers.  
The rules may consider attributes like Windows Security 
Logs events, a malicious IP address or domain name, URLs, a 
file hash, an upload exceeding a size limit etc. These rules are 
defined and set after a risk analysis to deploy the right security 
controls and measures.  
SIEM analysts define also the investigation and forensic 
process. The aim of this paper is not to recall the processes of 
the incident & response platforms. But we think it is relevant to 
insist on the collaborative and shared initiatives allowing for an 
automated and better detection of malicious behaviors. 
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III. RELATED WORK 
The GitHub web site APTnotes [3] intends to inventory 
various public documents, whitepapers and articles about APT 
campaigns since 2008 until 2017 with the purpose to provide the 
first threat intelligence exchange open platform publicly 
available. Most of the documents draw the attacks appearance 
and discuss their operational mode (strategy, intrusion, 
infection, propagation, mutation…), their lifecycle etc. 
OpenIOC [4] is a threat information sharing standard that 
allows one to logically group forensic artifacts, and 
communicate this information in a machine readable format. 
The terms are sometimes used interchangeably, but an IOC is a 
logically grouped set of descriptive terms about a specific threat 
while OpenIOC is the language used to describe those specific 
sets (e.g. an incident response team would use the OpenIOC 
format to write multiple IOCs during the course of responding 
to an incident). SOC analysts and experts will have an XML-
based schema framework allowing for advanced threat detection 
capability available.  
The MITRE Att&ck project [5] consists in gathering the 
knowledge about adversary tactics and techniques as observed 
in the real-world. CybOX™ International [6], in scope and free 
for public use, is a standardized schema for the specification, 
capture, characterization, and communication of events or 
stateful properties that are observable in the operational domain. 
STIX™ [7] is a collaborative community-driven effort to define 
and develop a standardized language to represent structured 
cyber threat information. TAXII™ [8] defines a set of services 
and message exchanges that, when implemented, enable sharing 
of actionable cyber threat information across organization and 
product/service boundaries. CAPEC™ [9] for Common Attack 
Pattern Enumeration and Classification intends to create a 
community resource for identifying and understanding attacks. 
Understanding how the adversary operates is essential to 
effective cyber security. CAPEC™ helps by providing a 
comprehensive dictionary of known patterns of attacks 
employed by adversaries to exploit known weaknesses in cyber-
enabled capabilities. It can be used by analysts, developers, 
testers, and educators to advance community understanding and 
enhance defenses. 
Finally, the MISP open source threat intelligence platform 
and open standards for threat information sharing stands for 
Malware Information Sharing Platform. It is more and more 
deployed as the threat intelligence platform for sharing, storing 
and correlating Indicators of Compromise of targeted attacks, 
threat intelligence, financial fraud information, vulnerability 
information or even counter-terrorism information. 
IV. USE CASE SCENARIO 
Detecting a legitimate password-based authentication from 
an illegitimate one is challenging. This issue was raised by the 
security administrators from our University who are concerned 
by detecting hacked accounts.  
Currently, there exist some markets on the dark web where 
anyone can easily buy credentials [10]. Universities are targeted 
by phishing attacks and some users’ credential might be stolen 
and stored in such databases. Even if the security policy 
constrains the University staff to change the passwords 
regularly, it is possible that illegitimate users can successfully 
authenticate into the information system. Detecting these 
connections is complicated. A first idea could be blocking 
connections coming from specific countries. Indeed, some 
countries are known for being the origin of cyberattacks [11]. 
However, researchers are travelling in these countries for 
attending conferences which makes this approach impracticable. 
As a consequence, the solution consists in analyzing the 
behavior of the accounts. When suspicious activities are 
detected, appropriate security measures are enforced (e.g., 
blocking the account). However, hackers do not launch 
immediately their attack right after buying the stolen account 
information. They first start by testing whether the account 
information is valid or not. Valid accounts will be used later in 
future attacks.  Since there is no suspect activity on the accounts 
not already used for an attack, the task of the security 
administrators is much more complex. The current practice 
consists in, when a suspect activity is performed on an account, 
to retrieve all the accounts that were successfully authenticated 
by the same origin as the account with the suspect activity and 
enforce on these suspicious accounts the necessary security 
measures (e.g. change the password immediately).  
V. EXPRESSING SITUATIONS USING COMPLEX EVENTS 
We developed a situation-awareness approach [12, 13, 14] 
to deal with such complex security management issues. In this 
section, we specify this use case scenario as a security situation-
based model. We also present how complex event processing 
techniques can compute security situations involving historical 
events to detect APTs. 
A situation is a specific time frame during which the result 
of some computed relationships between parts of the collected 
security events is stable. A security situation focuses on specific 
entities of interest to protect, which we call situation target, and 
a particular security concern. 
The situations related to the same situation target and the 
same security concern are in the same situation class. A situation 
class forms a weakly connected graph where vertices are the 
situations of the class and edges are context events impacting the 
stability of the situations. Situations of the same class are 
mutually exclusive, i.e., an entity can only be in a single situation 
of a given class at the same time. However, any entity can find 
itself in several situations in parallel provided all these situations 
belong to different classes. 
A situation, being a particular time frame of interest, has a 
beginning, a life span and an end [15]. The beginning and the 
end of a situation are determined by combining multiple events 
coming from multiple sensors and occurring at different 
moments. Indeed, a situation involving multiple entities and 
multiple conditions, the beginning and the end of a situation 
cannot be simple events captured by a single sensor. In addition, 
events being instantaneous, combining multiple events requires 
complex temporal operators (event ordering, event 
existence/absence, time windows, etc.) to specify the beginning 
and the end of situations. 
We follow the Complex Event Processing (CEP) approach 
for computing the beginning and the end of situations. CEP is “a 
defined set of tools and techniques for analysing and controlling 
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the complex series of interrelated events that drive modern 
distributed information systems” [16]. CEP solutions allow 
specifying complex events through complex event patterns that 
match incoming event notifications on the basis of their content 
as well as some ordering relationships on them. We choose 
Esper1, the open source event processing implementation 
maintained by Espertech. Esper offers a stream-oriented 
language for specifying complex event patterns, called Event 
Processing Language (EPL), that is an extension of SQL for 
processing events (e.g., windows definition and interaction, 
timed-data arithmetic definition, etc.) 
 
Figure 1. Situation class for account security level 
 
 
new-situation-attacked-because-virus =  
“insert into situation(accountName, hackerIP, 
situationValue, state, reason)”+ 
“select accountName, hackerIP, ‘account-attacked’ as 
situationValue, ‘start’ as state, ’detected by 
antivirus’ as reason from virus” 
 
new-situation-may-be-attacked-because-dangerous-ip= 
“insert into situation(accountName, hackerIP, 
situationValue, state, reason)”+ 
“select cq.accountName as accountName, cq.ip_src as 
hackerIP, ‘account-maybe-attacked’ as situationValue, 
‘start’ as state, ‘account contacted be hacker’ as 
reason from situation as cce left outer join”+ 
“sql:ESPER[‘select accountName, ip_src from LOGS 
where ip_src = ${cce.hackerIP}’] as cq on cce.hackerIP 
= cq.ip_src where cce.situationValue=’account-
attacked’ “ 
 
Figure 2. Sample of the situations specification in EPL 
In our scenario, a user account can be in three different 
situations regarding the security issue (Figure 1): 
• Situation ‘normal’ is the nominal behaviour where no 
abnormal activity or attack has been detected 
• Situation ‘account is attacked’ occurs when the 
administrator has enough evidence that the account is 
being attacked and may be under control of a hacker 
                                                        
1 http://www.espertech.com/esper/ 
• Situation ‘account may be attacked’ happens when an 
abnormal or potentially dangerous activity related to this 
account has been detected 
Specifying the situations using CEP consists in describing 
complex events by combining security events that constitute the 
edges of the situation class graph. For instance, the situation of 
a user account moves from situation ‘normal’ to situation 
‘account is attacked’ when a strong security indicator is 
activated, an antivirus or anti-rootkit throwing security context 
events. This could be easily expressed in ESPER EPL by the 
statement new-situation-attacked-because-
virus in Figure 2. This statement generates a new situation 
each time the CEP engine receives a virus event. Situations 
are stored as a table by the CEP engine. As a consequence, 
creating new situations consists in inserting new records in the 
situations table (insert into 
situation(accountName, hackerIP, 
situationValue, state, reason)). The transition 
between situation ‘normal’ and situation ‘account may be 
attacked’ is more complex. In our case, the security 
administrators have decided that a user account should be 
considered as potentially dangerous and requires specific 
security measures when a remote connection was successful in 
the past and the remote IP address is involved in a recent attack. 
This requirement is much more complex because it requires to 
combine recent and historical events. In our scenario, we 
consider that logs containing all the successful accesses are 
stored in an SQL database. The EPL rule new-situation-
may-be-attacked-because-dangerous-ip defines 
the following statement. Each time a situation ‘account-
attacked’ occurs, the ESPER engine retrieves all the 
accounts successfully accessed by the same IP address 
(cce.hackerIP = cq.ip_src) from the LOGS table. 
The situation of all these accounts is changed to ‘account-
may-be-attacked’ by throwing a complex event for every 
account. 
VI. EXPRESSING DYNAMIC SECURITY MEASURES DRIVEN BY 
SITUATIONS 
In our approach, situations are specified outside the security 
policy and the security policy needs only to refer to them. Hence, 
security policies are defined in a generic way as: when situation 
and some condition then authorization decision and/or 
obligation(s). This pattern allows the security administrator to 
specify both reactive and authorization rules: 
• reactive rules : when situation and situation begins [and 
some condition] then obligation(s) 
• authorization rules : when situation and some condition 
then authorization decision and/or obligation(s) 
XACMLv3 [17] allows the security administrators to 
express such kind of policies. First, it follows the Attribute 
Based Access Control (ABAC) approach [18] where policies 
describe general access control requirements in terms of 
constraints on security attributes; attributes being any 
Normal 
Situation
Situation 
‘Account may 
be attacked’
Situation 
‘Account is 
attacked’
Policy rule1= 
change the 
password
Policy rule2= 
Block the user 
account
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characteristics of entities. In addition, the XACMLv3 policy 
language includes obligations. Thus, XACMLv3 is not limited 
to PERMIT/DENY decisions only and can also describe 
complex decisions involving the modification of managed 
entities. 
In our scenario, the security administrator should specify two 
reactive rules (Figure 1): 
• Policy rule1 applies when the situation of an account 
changes to ‘account-may-be-attacked’. The 
security management system must react by launching the 
user password modification procedure. Following the 
situation driven policy pattern, this rule is specified as: 
when situation is ‘account-may-be-attacked’ and 
situation starts then obligation ‘modify the password of 
the account’. 
• Policy rule2 shall be enforced when the situation of an 
account becomes ‘account-attacked’. In this case, 
the security management system must block the account. 
Similarly as policy rule2, this rule is a reactive policy rule 
and can be specified as: when situation is ‘account-
attacked’ and situation starts then obligation ‘block the 
account’. Figure 3 shows the XACMLv3 specification of 
policy rule 2 (‘account-attacked’).  
 
Figure 3. XACMLv3 policy rule ‘account-attacked’ 
VII. DEPLOYING DYNAMIC SECURITY MEASURES DRIVEN BY 
SITUATIONS 
In [12], we developed dynSMAUG a situation-driven 
framework for dynamic security management. Its architecture 
aims at allowing the deployment of security policies including 
authorization and obligation policies. The deployment 
architecture consists in the following actors: 
• The broker is the distribution middleware that transmits all 
the events between the actors following the publish-
subscribe pattern. The broker divides events into three 
kinds of topics: the context events, the situation events and 
the decision events. It is also responsible for controlling the 
access to the dynSMAUG infrastructure (each 
dynSMAUG actor is authenticated by an X.509 
certificate).  
• The sensors produce context events (noted c in Erreur ! 
Source du renvoi introuvable.4). Context events are 
every instantaneous, detectable, and relevant security 
related information of the managed environment collected 
by sensors such as monitoring systems, intrusion detection 
systems, configuration management databases, etc. Each 
event is defined in XACMLv3 by a set of attributes of the 
form <identifier, type, value>. This solution has an 
advantage: it is possible to develop sensors in any 
programming language. 
• The situation manager contains a CEP engine that 
calculates situations according to a situation specification. 
It consumes context events and produces situation events 
(noted s in Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.4). 
Situation events have the same format as context events 
and are also carried in XACMLv3 format. Each time a new 
situation is calculated, the situation manager creates two 
situation events: the beginning of the new situation and the 
end of the last active situation. 
• The command centre is the brain of our security 
management framework. It consumes both context and 
situation events and produces decision events (noted d in 
Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.4). We specify 
security policies in XACMLv3. However, XACML PDPs 
only implement the outsourcing mode. Therefore, the 
command centre includes also a decision proxy for 
allowing the command centre to operate both authorization 
and obligation policies. Hence, the PDP acts in compliance 
with XACMLv3. When the decision proxy receives the 
decision from the PDP, it publishes the decision to the 
correct topic(s) based on attributes recipientTarget and 
recipientType to distribute it to the relevant actuators. 
• Finally, the actuators only consume decision events. An 
actuator checks if it is the recipient of the decisions and 
enforces them if so. Like sensors, it is possible to develop 
actuators in any programming language. 
                                  <xacml3:Rule Effect="Permit" RuleId="account_attacked">
   <xacml3:Description/>
   <xacml3:Target>
   <xacml3:AnyOf><xacml3:AllOf>
   <xacml3:Match
   MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
   <xacml3:AttributeValue
   DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
account_attacked
</xacml3:AttributeValue>
   <xacml3:AttributeDesignator
    AttributeId="urn:siera:situation_account:value"
    Category="urn:siera:name:attribute-category:situation"
    DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
    MustBePresent="true"/>
  </xacml3:Match>
<xacml3:Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal">
   <xacml3:AttributeValueDataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">
start
</xacml3:AttributeValue>
<xacml3:AttributeDesignator
    AttributeId="urn:siera:situation_account:state"
     Category="urn:siera:name:attribute-category:situation"
     DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
     MustBePresent="true"/>
   </xacml3:Match>
   </xacml3:AllOf></xacml3:AnyOf>
   </xacml3:Target>
   <xacml3:ObligationExpressions>
   <xacml3:ObligationExpression
   FulfillOn="Permit"
   ObligationId="block_account">
   <xacml3:AttributeAssignmentExpression
   AttributeId="urn:siera:name:attribute:block_account:account-id"
   Category="urn:siera:name:attribute-category:attributes">
<xacml3:AttributeDesignator
AttributeId="urn:siera:situation_account:account-name"
Category="urn:siera:name:attribute-category:situation"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
MustBePresent="true"/>
   </xacml3:AttributeAssignmentExpression>
   <xacml3:AttributeAssignmentExpression
   AttributeId="urn:siera:name:attribute:block_account:reason"
   Category="urn:siera:name:attribute-category:attributes">
   <xacml3:AttributeDesignator
AttributeId="urn:siera:situation_account:situation-reason"
Category="urn:siera:name:attribute-category:situation"
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"
MustBePresent="true"/>
  </xacml3:AttributeAssignmentExpression>
   </xacml3:ObligationExpression>
   </xacml3:ObligationExpressions>
   </xacml3:Rule>
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Figure 4. The dynSMAUG deployment architecture 
 
In our scenario, the anti-virus or the anti-rootkits are 
sensors. When they detect a fraudulent activity, they send a 
context event on the broker. This event is received by the 
situation manager that executes the EPL statements described 
Figure 2. The situation manager generates an event indicating 
that the situation of the account is changing to ‘account-
attacked’ on the broker (EPL statement new-situation-
attacked-because-virus). In parallel, it retrieves the accounts 
that were accessed by the same IP address and generates an 
event informing that situation is now ‘account-may-be-
attacked’ for each matching account (EPL statement new-
situation-may-be-attacked-because-dangerous-ip). 
When the command centre receives these events, it consults its 
policy and generates decision events to block the attacked 
account and modify the password of the suspicious accounts. 
Finally, the appropriate actuators enforce the decision on the 
managed system. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 Detecting and thwarting complex cyber-attacks requires 
security administrators to retain a large number of logs in case 
problems are detected latter and involve the investigation of past 
security events. Indeed, benign activities might actually 
represent early stages of an attack. However, this approach 
generates massive data and appropriate techniques have to be 
employed to analyse it and react accordingly.  
 In this article, we explained how our situation-based security 
management approach can facilitate the detection of complex 
attacks and the enforcement of dynamic security measures 
accordingly. Complex event processing provides analytics tools 
to specify complex statements able to analyse current and 
historical events in a unified language. We built a security 
situation manager that can handle long range attacks. When it is 
coupled with a security management infrastructure, dynamic 
security measures can react automatically to multistage attacks. 
We applied this idea to detect and react to a legitimate password-
based authentication from an illegitimate user use case. 
The security decision-making process must consider that 
security sensors (logs, IDS, etc) provide intrinsically inaccurate, 
erroneous and ambiguous information. Indeed, bad or 
misinterpreted security information can lead to mistakenly 
believe the system is in a specific situation, which results in 
wrong decisions and irrelevant reactions at the end. Currently, 
SIEMs only consider basic information to calculate the 
reliability of security events. A more expressive representation 
is required for describing the complexity of the reliability of 
security event. We will propose a generic expression of security 
events reliability artifacts based on existing research on Quality 
of Context. Then, we will enhance the situation calculus to 
handle security events reliability and the decision making 
process to support different situation trust levels.  
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